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EVIDENCE: THE 1984-85 TERM-A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF
SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS APPLYING THE




The Federal Rules of Evidence have now been in effect for over a
decade.' It has become almost commonplace to observe that while some
feared that codification of common law evidentiary principles would pro-
duce rigidity and an inability to deal with unforeseen circumstances, such
fears were unfounded. 2 Indeed, some commentators feel that the broad
discretion granted to the district courts by the Rules has resulted in too
much flexibility and too few meaningful restraints on the admission of
evidence. One commentator recently observed, referring to the un-
founded fears just noted: "There was no need to worry. Judicial ingenu-
ity has been stimulated, not stifled. When necessary (and sometimes
when not), the courts have stretched or even disregarded the language of
the rules and the intent of Congress. We have flexibility aplenty."'3 On
the whole, despite certain continuing problem areas with the Rules, it
may safely be said, as one commentator observed, that after a decade's
experience with the Rules, "one's judgment must be that the Rules are
doing very well indeed . .. .,4
During the 1984-85 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the
* B.A., Rosary College, 1974; M.A.L.S., Rosary College Graduate School of Library and
Information Science, 1978; J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1986.
** B.S., Business, University of Southern California, 1982; J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1986.
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence were signed into law by President Ford on January 2, 1975,
and became effective on July 1, 1975. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926
(codified at 28 U.S.C. app. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The Federal Rules of Evidence are referred to
herein as the Federal Rules or the Rules.
2. See, e.g., Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 LITIGATION 13, 13 (1983); Rice and Orr, Seventh
Circuit Review- Evidence: Application and Refinement of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the Sev-
enth Circuit, 61 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 395 (1985).
3. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 Litigation 13, 13 (1983).
4. Younger, Introduction, Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.
251, 254 (1984). For an excellent examination of how the Federal Rules have been working since the
Rules' enactment, see SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMERGING
PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1983) (hereinafter cited as EMERGING
PROBLEMS). As its title suggests, the Report particularly focuses on recurring problem areas exper-
ienced under the Rules.
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Seventh Circuit addressed challenges to evidentiary rulings by the dis-
trict courts in over one hundred decisions. One difficulty with selecting
decisions meriting discussion in this article is that the standard of review
on evidentiary rulings is the abuse of discretion standard, and the trial
courts are granted broad discretion by the Federal Rules. Two conse-
quences of those facts are that, first, sometimes the appellate court's anal-
ysis of evidentiary issues is quite cursory, and second, very few decisions
are reversed on evidentiary grounds. In addition, because the Federal
Rules encourage flexibility, 5 and again because the standard of review is
abuse of discretion, there are not widely varying precedents from term to
term, which is commendable. One goal of codification is to promote con-
sistency, and a review of the case law reveals that the Seventh Circuit
largely achieves that goal without sacrificing flexibility or stifling creative
solutions to new problems and novel factual situations. That is not to say
that the Seventh Circuit mechanically applies its prior decisions to new
cases. On the contrary, the court rendered a number of interesting and
important decisions during the past term. This article focuses on deci-
sions which are significant for one of the following reasons: (1) the deci-
sions deal with issues which are frequently litigated; (2) the case
presented the court with an issue of first impression; (3) the decision
reveals a split of authority among the Circuit Courts of Appeals; or
(4) the decision resolved an issue previously left open by the court.
RULE 403: EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Rule 403 adopted the common law principle that in certain circum-
stances, relevant evidence may be inadmissible.6 Rule 403 states that rel-
evant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 7 The balancing test enun-
ciated in Rule 403 is incorporated in several other Rules which apply the
5. FED. R. EVID. 102, "Purpose and Construction," states: "These rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."
6. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The state may not show
defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even
though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the
crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary it is said to weigh
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.") (footnotes omitted).
7. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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test to specific, commonly recurring situations." Rule 403 allows the trial
court to balance the value of the evidence offered against its potential
harmful effects in situations which are not covered by a specific Rule.9
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that application of Rule 403 oc-
curs in a multitude of differing factual situations. To accomplish the fun-
damental goals of fairness and flexibility that are the cornerstones of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 10 the trial judge must be allowed great discre-
tion in the application of Rule 403. Therefore, the court has consistently
stressed that a trial judge's decision is to be accorded great deference and
will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. "
However, allowing trial judges substantial discretion adds difficulty
to the task of appellate review. Thus, in order for the appellate court to
have an adequate basis for review of a trial judge's decision, the court has
encouraged, without requiring, the trial judge to enter written findings on
the results of the balancing test.12 In most instances, the court has de-
ferred to the trial judge's decision rather than attempting to apply a strict
definition of what constitutes unfair prejudice.
The degree of deference the Seventh Circuit will accord a trial
judge's decision is illustrated by United States v. Medina.13 In Medina,
the defendants challenged the admission of several statements, contend-
ing that the statements were unfairly prejudicial. The defendants were
inmates convicted of first degree murder and conveying weapons within a
penal institution. 14 The court began its analysis by first acknowledging
the deference that the trial judge's decision is to be accorded and then
addressed the balancing test of probative value versus unfair prejudice.
The court defined probative value as the extent to which it makes the
existence of a fact in issue more or less likely.
The court then focused on the challenged statements. The first
statement was made by a fellow inmate and revealed that the defendant
was angry with the deceased because the deceased refused to murder an-
8. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee Note states: "The rules which follow in this
Article are concrete applications evolved for particular situations."
9. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee Note states that Rule 403 "is designed as a guide
for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have been formulated."
10. FED. R. EvID. 102. See supra note 5.
11. The court's deference to the trial judge's decision is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's
analysis in similar cases in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Covell, 738 F.2d 847, 854 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 211 (1985); United States v. Serlin, 707 F.2d 953, 959 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Solomon, 688 F.2d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 1982).
12. See United States v. DeJohn, 638 F.2d 1048, 1053 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dolliole,
597 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979).
13. 755 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1985).
14. Defendants Steven Medina and Ronald Crowder were inmates at the United States Peniten-
tiary at Terre Haute, Indiana.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
other inmate suspected of being an informant. The defendant contended
that allowing this statement into evidence caused him unfair prejudice
because it implicated the defendant in an uncharged crime. The govern-
ment maintained that the statement was necessary to help show the de-
fendant's motive. The court, with little discussion, found that since the
purpose of the statement was to show the defendant's motive, the proba-
tive value of the statement outweighed its prejudicial effect.' 5
The defendant also objected to a statement made by a prison official.
The prison official testified that after the defendant was taken from his
cell and placed in the prison detention center, the defendant stated:
"that's all right, I will beat you on the next one." 16 The government
maintained that this statement clearly implicated the defendant in the
murder. The court agreed with the defendant that this statement was
prejudicial to his alibi. However, it was not the type of prejudicial state-
ment which Rule 403 was designed to exclude.' 7 The court concluded
that all relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial, but such evidence will
only be excluded when the prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value.
In contrast, in Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., t8 the court re-
versed the trial court because certain evidence was found to be so preju-
dicial that it was an abuse of discretion not to exclude it under Rule 403.
In Douglass, the plaintiff, an actress and model, brought an invasion of
privacy action against Hustler magazine, alleging that it published nude
photographs of her without her consent.' 9 The plaintiff posed for nude
photographs to be published in Playboy magazine. The photographs
were published in Playboy and at a later date several photos from the
same session were published in Hustler.20 In an attempt to distinguish
the two magazines, the plaintiff introduced 128 slides showing some of
the vilest photographs and cartoons that were published in Hustler
15. 755 F.2d 1269, 1275 (7th Cir. 1985).
16. Id. at 1274. The defendant objected when the prison official began to testify regarding the
statement. The government's offer of proof was as follows: "We expect the witness to testify that
Defendant Crowder said at that time something to the effect that "that's all right, I'll beat you on the
next one. I'm going to leave one at your office door and you won't know who did it. Yes, I'm going
to cut his head off and leave him there and you won't know who did it." The trial court permitted
Thomas to testify to Crowder's statement, but excluded as inflammatory the reference to the manner
in which the "next one" would die.
17. Id. at 1275.
18. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986).
19. Id. at 1131-32.
20. Id. The plaintiff signed a release that authorized Playboy to publish or otherwise use the
photographs in a lawful manner. However, Hustler could not produce a valid release signed by the
plaintiff.
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through the years.2 1
The defendant maintained that the slides were unfairly prejudicial
and should have been excluded under Rule 403, and the appellate court
agreed. The court found that selecting the 128 worst pictures from many
years of the magazine was unfairly prejudicial to Hustler. The court
found the slides unfairly prejudicial because they were not a random or
representative sample of the magazine's content.22 The court concluded
that admission of the slides constituted reversible error because the de-
fendant was a member of the press and therefore entitled to assiduous
protection.
23
The approach of the court in Medina24 was typical of the Seventh
Circuit's treatment of Rule 403 issues in the last term. The court, while
analyzing the prejudicial value of the evidence, acknowledged the sub-
stantial discretion of the trial judge in ruling on the relevancy of the ten-
dered evidence. However, as shown in Douglass,25 the court will reverse
the trial judge if it finds that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. This
approach has not created a uniform definition of unfair prejudice. How-
ever, the court's current approach is necessary to promote the goals of
fairness and flexibility.
RULE 404: CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Rule 404 reflects the common law principle that evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove that the defendant had
the propensity to commit a crime.26 Evidence of other bad acts is gener-
ally not allowed because such evidence lacks probative force and has the
tendency to create unfair prejudice and confusion. 27 Rule 404(b) does
allow character evidence if it is offered for purposes other than to prove a
propensity to commit the crime with which the defendant is charged.
28
21. Id. at 1141-42. The court found that the viewer of the slide presentation would think the
magazine was wholly given over to racially offensive cartoons, grotesque photographs, foul language
and obscenities.
22. Id. at 1142. The court found that the pictures were selected with a view to highlighting the
most offensive features of the magazine.
23. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
24. 755 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1985).
25. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
26. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) states: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion. .. "
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301,
305 (7th Cir. 1968) (prior crime evidence is "always unduly prejudicial").
28. Rule 404(b) provides that other crimes, wrongs, or acts "may be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence
of mistake or accident."
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
In several decisions the Seventh Circuit has discussed the criteria
which must be met for evidence of bad acts to be admissible under Rule
404(b). 29 First, the evidence must be directed toward establishing a mat-
ter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime
charged. Second, the other act must be similar enough and close enough
in time to be relevant to the matter at issue. Third, the evidence must be
clear and convincing. Fourth, the probative value of the evidence must
not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
During the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit was faced with Rule
404 issues on several occasions. In each of these cases, the Seventh Cir-
cuit accorded great deference to the trial judge's assessment of the admis-
sibility of tendered evidence because of "his firsthand exposure to the
evidence and his familiarity with the course of the trial proceeding.
30
Thus, in most of the cases, the issues were uncomplicated and the court
was unsympathetic to the appellants.31 Other cases, however, presented
interesting and important questions.
In United States v. Williams,32 the court found that the admission of
a police officer's testimony regarding defendant's nickname constituted
reversible error. In Williams, the defendant was convicted of transport-
ing stolen vehicles in interstate commerce.33 Defendant maintained that
the detective's testimony that he knew the defendant by the nickname
"Fast Eddie" should not have been admitted. Defendant argued that the
nickname suggested bad character and having a police detective testify
intimated to the jury that the defendant was known to be involved in
criminal activity. 34 The government contended that "Fast Eddie" is a
neutral name that did not suggest that the defendant had a criminal
reputation.
The court found it to be self-evident that the detective's testimony
might suggest to the jury that the defendant had some sort of history or
reputation of unsavory activity. 35 The court acknowledged that the pros-
29. This standard has been set out in numerous Seventh Circuit decisions. See, e.g., United
States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kane, 726 F.2d 344, 348
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. United States v. Levy, 741 F.2d 915, 924 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 440 (1984).
31. Id. "This circuit, among others, has time and time again responded to the type of argument
raised by appellant [admission of several items of bad act evidence] and should not have to do so
again except in an appropriate case."
32. 739 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 298. The defendant was found guilty on four counts of transporting stolen motor
vehicles in interstate commerce in violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1982) and of aiding
and abetting the commission of Dyer Act violations, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
34. Id. at 299.
35. Id.
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ecutor may introduce evidence of a defendant's alias or nickname if it
aids in the identification of the defendant or is directly related to the
proof of the acts charged. The court found the testimony regarding de-
fendant's nickname to be completely unrelated to any of the other proof
presented. 36 Therefore, the testimony violated Rule 404(a) and should
not have been admitted because it caused undue prejudice and denied the
defendant the opportunity to defend against the particular charge. 37
In contrast, United States v. Hattaway38 illustrates that evidence of
egregious acts is admissible if it is necessary to prove the particular
charge and is intricately related to the facts of the case. In Hattaway, five
members of a motorcycle gang were convicted of various crimes39 arising
from the kidnapping of a woman. The defendants claimed that the ad-
mission of evidence of their lifestyle violated Rule 404(b) because it was
submitted to prove the defendants' bad character.4° The government
maintained that the lifestyle evidence was introduced because it was in-
tricately related to the charges against the defendants. 41
The court held that evidence of the defendants' lifestyle, including
information about their drug use, sexual activities, nicknames and other
"6socially unacceptable" activities, was admissible.42 The court found
that evidence of drug and alcohol use helped substantiate the govern-
ment's allegation that defendants used psychological control over the vic-
tim. The court also found that the evidence of sexual activity was related
to the Mann Act charges. The use of nicknames was also necessary be-
cause the defendants only used nicknames to identify themselves in the
victim's presence. 43 Therefore, the evidence was not admitted to prove
bad character because it was intricately related to the facts of the case.
This case illustrates that the court will allow the introduction of "dis-
gusting and offensive" 44 evidence if it is intricately related to the facts of
the case and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
36. Id. at 299-300. The court stated that the prosecution's only possible purpose in eliciting the
testimony was to create an impression in the minds of the jurors that the defendant was known by
the police to be an unsavory character or even a criminal.
37. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. 740 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 599 (1984).
39. Id. at 1423 n.3. All five defendants were charged with conspiracy to kidnap, kidnapping,
conspiracy to violate the Mann Act, Mann Act violations, and unlawful firearms use.
40. Id. at 1424.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1425.
43. Id. The court held that forbidding the victim from using the nicknames (such as Hitler,
Mad Mad Dog, Scarface, and Crazy Horse) would have placed an undue burden on her testimony.
44. The defendants argued and the court agreed that the lifestyle evidence was disgustingly
offensive. However, the defendants did not argue that it painted an inaccurate picture of life with the
gang.
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In United States v. Chaimson,45 the court allowed evidence of other
acts to be introduced to establish intent.46 In Chaimson, the defendant
was convicted of mail fraud and racketeering47 in a scheme among em-
ployees of the Cook County Board of Appeals, Chicago area attorneys
and Chicago area tax consultants to fraudulently reduce real estate as-
sessments. 48 The defendant, a Chicago attorney, worked on a large
number of real estate assessment cases between 1976 and 1979 which
were fraudulently reduced after bribes were passed from the defendant to
the Board of Appeals.
At trial, the defendant took the stand and denied any knowledge of
the fraudulent scheme, denied participating in the scheme, and denied
paying any bribes. The govenment then put on testimony that showed
the defendant made bribe payments in 1971. The defendant contended
that the trial court erred in allowing testimony about prior bribe pay-
ments because it was introduced for the sole purpose of demonstrating
his propensity to commit the crime charged. The government mantained
that the evidence was introduced to show intent.
The defendant acknowledged that mail fraud is a specific intent
crime and that evidence of previous bribe payments is relevant to the
issue of intent.49 However, the defendant contended that intent was not
at issue because his defense was that he had no knowledge of the fraudu-
lent reduction scheme. In support of this argument, the defendant cited
a line of Second Circuit cases.
In both United States v. O'Connor5° and United States v. Bene-
detto,51 the defendants were federal meat inspectors accused of taking
bribes, and the prosecution used evidence of other bribes not charged in
the indictment to show intent. In both cases, the Second Circuit found
that the "other acts" evidence was not admissible to show intent. "De-
fendant did not claim that he took the money. . . innocently or mistak-
enly. He claimed that he did not take the money at all. Knowledge and
intent, while technically at issue, were not really in dispute .... ,,52
The defendant in Chaimson also relied on United States v.
45. 760 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985).
46. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for purposes such
as proof of motive, opportunity or intent.
47. 760 F.2d at 800. The defendant was convicted of fifteen counts of mail fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1340 and one count of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 805.
50. 580 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
51. 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 1249, quoted in United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d at 41.
534
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Manafzadeh,53 in which the defendant was charged with two counts of
unlawfully transporting fraudulent checks in interstate commerce. As a
defense to this specific intent crime, the defendant claimed that he had
never been involved in the creation or negotiation of the fraudulent
checks at all. 54 The prosecution introduced evidence that four months
after the crime in question, the defendant attempted a similar scheme. 55
The defendant offered to stipulate that if the jury found that he partici-
pated in the creation of forged checks, he would concede the issue of
intent. The Second Circuit therefore ruled that the "other acts" evidence
was inadmissible to prove intent because intent was not at issue.5 6 In
cases subsequent to Manafzadeh, the Second Circuit has emphasized the
defendant's willingness to stipulate that if the jury found the defendant
participated in the crime charged, he would concede the issue of intent. 57
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chaimson rejected the de-
fendant's argument and the Second Circuit's reasoning because it allows
the defendant to remove intent as an element of the crime charged. 58
The court then stated that where the government must prove specific
intent as an element of the crime charged, it is well established that evi-
dence of other acts may be introduced to establish that intent, 59 if it
meets the four-pronged test.
The court in Chaimson found that the evidence met the first require-
ment because it was directed toward establishing intent. The court found
that passing bribes in 1971 was sufficiently related in time to bribe pay-
ments from 1976 to 1979 to satisfy the closeness in time requirement. 60
The defendant contended that the government failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the earlier bribe payments were in fact a
crime. The court stated that the clear and convincing standard is
designed to prevent the admission of circumstantial evidence of the mere
inference of participation in a prior crime.61 The clear and convincing
standard was met by direct testimony of two witnesses that the defendant
participated in the prior crime. The final test is the balancing test of Rule
53. 592 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 85.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 87.
57. See United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 752-54 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Danzey,
594 F.2d 905, 912 n. 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979).
58. 760 F.2d at 805.
59. See United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Price,
617 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1979).
60. See United States v. Rudseck, 718 F.2d 233, 236-37 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029
(1984) (five years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1976) (five years).
61. See United States v. Hyman, 741 F.2d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Berkwitt,
619 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1980).
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403.62 The court acknowledged the deference accorded the trial judge in
this decision.
63
The Seventh Circuit's approach to the admissibility of "other acts"
evidence is preferable to the view of the Second Circuit. The Second
Circuit, in effect, allows the defendant to remove the element of intent
from the case. The Seventh Circuit allows the introduction of evidence
of other acts when the crime charged requires proof of specific intent and
the requirements of Rules 404(b) and 403 are satisfied. 64 However, the
Seventh Circuit does not allow intent to automatically become an issue,
where intent is inferable from the nature of the act charged. 65 To do so
would create an exception that would virtually swallow the rule against
admission of evidence of prior misconduct. 66 Therefore, where intent is
only a formal issue, so that proof of the proscribed act gives rise to an
inference of intent, the court will not admit evidence of other acts during
the government's case-in-chief, unless the government has reason to be-
lieve that the defense will raise intent as an issue.67 The approach fol-
lowed by the Seventh Circuit strikes the proper balance between the
conflicting interests while following the intent of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
RULE 609: IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
During the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit reviewed three inter-
esting cases in which the evidentiary issue on appeal concerned the trial
court's exclusion or admission of prior convictions pursuant to Rule
609.68 At issue in Christmas v. Sanders,6 9 a civil rights action, was Rule
609(a)(1). 70 The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the trial court's ex-
clusion of evidence concerning plaintiff's prior rape conviction. In its
opinion, the court discussed the differing views of courts and commenta-
tors on the question of what Rule or Rules govern the admissibility of
62. 760 F.2d at 808.
63. Id.
64. See United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1009 (6th Cir. 1975).
67. 738 F.2d at 781.
68. FED. R. EviD. 609. "Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime".
69. 759 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
70. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, . . . .
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prior felony convictions in civil cases. 71  The court, however, found it
unnecessary to take a position on the question.
72
The evidentiary issue on appeal in United States v. Kuecker73 con-
cerned the proper interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2). 74 In Kuecker, the
Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of "whether district courts retain the
residual discretion under Rule 403 to exclude a prior conviction admissi-
ble under Rule 609(a)(2), '' 75 an issue which the Seventh Circuit had ex-
pressly left open in United States v. Papia.76 The Seventh Circuit in
Kuecker, joining "all circuits that have decided the issue,"' 77 held that
evidence of prior convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement is admissible without a balancing of probative value against
prejudicial effect.
78
In United States v. Noble,79 the Seventh Circuit had occasion to ap-
ply its holding in Kuecker to an unusual factual situation. In Noble, the
Seventh Circuit held that once the defendant had placed his credibility in
issue, the trial court properly allowed the government to impeach the
defendant with his prior counterfeiting conviction without balancing the
conviction's probative value against its prejudicial effect.
The use of prior convictions to impeach was an extremely contro-
versial issue at the time the Federal Rules were enacted .80 Both subdivi-
sions (1) and (2) of Rule 609(a) have caused the courts considerable
problems and, not surprisingly, have been inconsistently interpreted by
the courts. 81 The commentators appear to agree that the problems are
71. Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d at 1290-91.
72. Id. at 1293.
73. 740 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1984).
74. FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(2) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime. . . involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
75. United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 501 (quoting United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827,
845 n. 10 (7th Cir. 1977)).
76. 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 501.
78. Id. at 501.
79. 754 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 63 (1985).
80. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE at 609-14 (1985).
81. For example, compare Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2157 (1985) (held, in civil cases, district judge has no discretion under either Rule 403 or Rule
609(a)(1) to exclude prior felony convictions when offered to impeach plaintiff) with Christmas v.
Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1985) (although appellate court found it unnecessary to
decide which Rule governs prior convictions in civil cases, appellate court found no abuse of discre-
tion where trial court excluded evidence of plaintiff's prior rape conviction pursuant to Rule
609(a)(1)). Rule 403 grants the trial court discretion to exclude relevant evidence on the grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
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caused by poor drafting,82 which in turn is explained by the Rule's legis-
lative history. 83 The legislative history reveals that the drafters of the
Rule were primarily concerned with evidence of prior convictions used to
impeach criminal defendants.84 The fact that the Rule specifically re-
quires judicial balancing of the conviction's probative value against its
prejudicial effect to the defendant,85 accounts for the problems encoun-
tered when a prior conviction is offered to impeach either the plaintiff in
a civil case 86 or a government witness in a criminal case.
87
82. See, e.g., EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 172 ("drafting of Rule 609(a)(1) is as
weak as the drafting of any rule .... "); Younger, Introduction, Symposium: The Federal Rules of
Evidence, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 251, 252-53 (1984) (Younger points to Rule 609 as one instance
where the Rules are "sometimes incoherent." He notes that Rule 609(a) begins by referring to "a
witness" but goes on in its first conditional clause to speak of "the defendant." The Rule, therefore,
according to Younger, is incoherent on the question of exactly what impeachment is permissible of a
mere witness as opposed to the defendant in a criminal case.); Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence:
Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 270 (1984) (the relation-
ship between Rule 609 and Rule 403 is in need of clarification).
83. EMERGING PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 172, bluntly attributes the weak drafting of Rule
609(a)(1) "to the last ditch compromise reached between House and Senate conferees." Subdivision
(a) of the Rule as prescribed by the Supreme Court was revised successively in the House, in the
Senate, and in the Conference. Note by Federal Judicial Center, reprinted in FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 609 at 71. (West 1984). The
foregoing West publication contains all of the Federal Rules of Evidence plus useful legislative his-
tory materials on each Rule, including portions of the Report of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Conference Report, and the Advisory
Committee's Notes. For a more exhaustive account of Rule 609's legislative history, including Con-
gressional debates, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609 at 609-2 to -
40 (1985). According to Weinstein and Berger, "Congress considered the prior conviction to im-
peach issue more fully than any other single rule . 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[04] at 609-70 (1985).
84. It is clear, however, that the drafters also considered the issue of prior convictions used
against witnesses other than defendants. The Conference Report states, in relevant part:
With regard to the discretionary standard established by paragraph (1) of rule 609(a),
the Conference determined that the prejudicial effect to be weighed against the probative
value of the conviction is specifically the prejudicial effect to the defendant. The danger of
prejudice to a witness other than the defendant (such as injury to the witness' reputation in
his community) was considered and rejected by the Conference as an element to be
weighed in determining admissibility. It was the judgment of the Conference that the dan-
ger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to
have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible. Such evidence
should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome
of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior
criminal record. [Emphasis in original.]
H.R., FED. R. EVID., CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 9 (1974), reprinted in FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 609 at 75 (West
1984).
85. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), supra note 70.
86. See, e.g., Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
87. Rule 609(a) does not expressly address the issues of impeachment of prosecution witnesses
or civil plaintiffs. One reading of the Rule is that the language "and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence [of a prior conviction] outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the defendant" implies that no such balancing is required or even allowed where the witness is not a
defendant. The legislative history does support the foregoing interpretation. See supra note 84.
Some circuits have adopted that interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406, 408-
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The disputed evidence in Christmas v. Sanders88 was the plaintiff's
prior rape conviction. Christmas arose from the shooting of the plaintiff
by the defendant Sanders, an off-duty police officer. Plaintiff brought a
civil rights action against defendant claiming that Sanders' unprovoked
assault deprived him of liberty without due process of law, constituted
use of excessive force, and resulted in an arrest without probable cause.
The facts were sharply disputed. Under the defendant's version of the
events, plaintiff and his friends verbally harassed her (Sanders), plaintiff
resisted defendant's attempts to arrest him for disorderly conduct by
striking her in the face and chest, the pair struggled, and defendant's gun
accidentally discharged into plaintiff's abdomen.8 9 The trial judge in-
structed the jury that if it believed the plaintiff's version of the events,
under which defendant Sanders had intentionally and without provoca-
tion shot plaintiff, then it should find in plaintiff's favor. The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $20,000 and judgment was
entered. 90
The trial judge had granted plaintiff's motion in limine under Rule
609(a)(1) to prohibit the defendant from introducing any evidence re-
garding plaintiff's conviction for rape in May 1983.91 On appeal, defend-
ant argued that the trial judge improperly excluded the evidence of
plaintiff's prior conviction. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument
and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
In Christmas, the trial judge granted plaintiff's motion to exclude
his prior conviction on the grounds that a rape conviction was only mini-
mally probative of plaintiff's credibility and would very likely prejudice
plaintiff "inasmuch as jurors might be unwilling to award damages to an
incarcerated felon."' 92 On appeal, defendant challenged that evidentiary
ruling, arguing first that Rule 609(a)(1) was inapplicable to the case, and
second, even if the Rule was applicable, the trial judge abused her discre-
tion in applying that Rule in that she should have found that the proba-
tive value of the conviction was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
93
09 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979) (held, Rule 609(a) deprives the court of all
discretion to exclude impeachment by convictions when offered by criminal defendants against pros-
ecution witnesses). But see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[06] at
609-89 to -90 (1985) (noting that it is still an open question whether Rule 403 might ever afford the
trial court discretion to exclude prior convictions of prosecution witnesses and witnesses in civil
cases, though expressing the opinion that "the discretion, if it exists, should be narrowly circum-
scribed since Congress spoke so clearly on the point").
88. 759 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 1286.
90. Id. at 1287.
91. Id. at 1289.
92. Id. The trial court did not issue an opinion.
93. Id.
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In addressing the defendant's arguments, the Seventh Circuit began
by stating that "[tihe questions of what rule governs the admissibility of
prior felony convictions in civil cases and whether a district judge has
discretion to exclude such evidence are sharply disputed. ' 94 The court
then surveyed the various viewpoints on the foregoing questions. First,
several courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have assumed without de-
ciding that the balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1) applies in civil cases. 95
Recently, however, the Third Circuit has taken a different view. In Diggs
v. Lyons,96 a civil rights action, the Third Circuit held that Rule
609(a)(1) governs the admissibility of prior felony convictions in civil
cases and that the court has no discretion under that Rule to exclude
prior felony convictions when offered to impeach a plaintiff. Several
commentators support the Third Circuit's position.97 Under a third
view, some authorities take the position that Rule 403 may be invoked in
civil cases to exclude evidence of a party's prior felony conviction,
although as the court in Christmas noted, those authorities offer differing
rationales for that position.98
The Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to decide which of the
foregoing views is the better one because defendant waived her right to
reversal on the ground of the exclusion of the prior conviction. Neither
party had raised the issue of the inapplicability of Rule 609(a)(1) before
the district judge and the issue was presented to the appellate court for
the first time in defendant's reply brief. Defendant apparently conceded
that it is well established that an issue not first presented to the district
court may not be raised before the appellate court as a ground for rever-
sal. 99 However, defendant argued that the appellate court should reach
the issue because the court's failure to consider it would work'a manifest
injustice on her. The appellate court disagreed, although its reasoning on
this point is somewhat confused.10° Ultimately, although the court held
94. Id. at 1290.
95. The court in Christmas cited as examples the following decisions: Leonard v. Argento, 699
F.2d 874, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-
59 (5th Cir. 1981); Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1981); Shingleton v. Armour
Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cited in Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1290.
96. 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2157 (1985).
97. The court cited as examples the following commentators: LOUISDELL & MUELLER, 3 FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE § 316 at 322, 324-35 (1979 & Supp. 1984); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 at 11
(Supp. 1978), cited in Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1291.
98. For example, one authority concludes that Rule 403 may be invoked because although the
language of Rule 609(a) suggests no discretion, that interpretation leads to absurd and unfair results.
10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 609.03 (1982), cited in Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1291.
99. Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1291 [citations omitted].
100. The defendant argued that the balancing test of Rule 403 (relevant evidence should be
excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative value) rather than that of Rule
609(a)(1) (which does not include the word "substantially") should have been applied. The court
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that defendant had waived the issue, and although it appeared to assume
without deciding that the balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1) applied to the
instant case,10' the court nevertheless conducted its own analysis of the
exclusion of the prior conviction under Rule 403. According to the
court, even if Rule 403 was the applicable rule, the conviction was prop-
erly excluded because, although probative, it was merely cumulative. 102
Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on equitable grounds, reason-
ing that reversal would work a greater injustice on plaintiff than on de-
fendant.t0 3 Given the amount of discussion the court devoted to an issue
that it declined to decide (particularly where the court could have dis-
missed the issue simply on the basis that defendant had waived it), it
appears that the court would be inclined to take a position, given the
right vehicle. 104 Absent an amendment of the Rule clarifying the use of
prior convictions to impeach witnesses in civil cases, t0 5 it would be help-
stated that "if we were to agree that Rule 403 should have been applied, then we would probably
have had to reverse" but later stated that "it is not at all clear that if the district judge had decided to
exclude the evidence under Rule 403, we would have found that decision to be an abuse of discre-
tion." Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1292. The court correctly noted that the difference in language in
Rules 403 and 609(a)(1) is:
not necessarily a semantic difference. [Citations omitted]. Under Rule 609(a)(1), a prior
felony conviction may only be admitted if the probative value is not outweighed by the
prejudicial effect; it must be admitted under Rule 403, however, unless the prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs probative value. Thus, Rule 609(a)(1) leans heavily toward exclu-
sion, while Rule 403 leans heavily toward admissibility.
Id.
101. The court never expressly stated that this was its position. However, in setting forth the
various viewpoints on the issue of which rule governs the admissibility of prior convictions in civil
cases, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit "has assumed without deciding that the balancing test
of Rule 609(a)(1) applies .... " Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1290. Since the court expressly declined to
take a position on the issue, presumably the governing principle in the Seventh Circuit after Christ-
mas continues to be that the court assumes without deciding that the balancing test of Rule 609(a)(1)
applies.
102. Christmas, a young man, admitted that he had been unemployed most of his adult life due
to no disability. "Even without the rape conviction, Christmas presented the image of a man un-
likely to lead a traditional upstanding life." Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1293. It is debatable whether the
conviction was properly excluded on the ground that it was merely cumulative, since it appears there
was no evidence concerning plaintiff's lifestyle other than his lack of employment. It is at least quite
ironic that in a case involving the prior conviction rule, designed primarily to prevent undue preju-
dice to persons with prior convictions, the exclusion of such evidence was upheld on the ground that
the evidence was cumulative.
103. Defendant was represented by Corporation Counsel of Chicago. Plaintiff, an individual,
would be put to the expense, uncertainty, and delay of further proceedings in a case already three
and one-half years old on a ground that required the court to decide a difficult issue, solely because
of defendant's "inexcusable failure" to raise the issue below. Christmas, 759 F.2d at 1293.
104. The court noted that the district court did not issue an opinion, there had been no briefing
in the Seventh Circuit, and plaintiff had no opportunity to respond to the issue. Id.
105. Writers have urged that such an amendment be enacted. See, e.g., EMERGING PROBLEMS,
supra note 4, at 172 ("Clarification by amendment would be useful to indicate what protection, if
any, . . . civil litigants are entitled to under the rule.")
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ful for the district courts to have a definitive ruling from the Seventh
Circuit on the issue.
In contrast to Christmas v. Sanders, the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Kuecker 10 6 took a definite stand on another issue raised by Rule
609. The evidentiary issue on appeal was whether a trial court has any
discretion to prevent the introduction, for impeachment purposes, of evi-
dence of prior convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false state-
ment. The Seventh Circuit held that a trial court has no discretion to
prevent introduction of such evidence. 107
In Kuecker, defendant was convicted on twelve counts of mail fraud
and three counts of wire fraud. Prior to trial, defendant made a motion
in limine to prevent the government from introducing evidence of de-
fendant's prior mail fraud conviction. In his motion, defendant argued
that the trial court should balance the prejudice to him against the con-
viction's probative value, pursuant to Rule 403. The defendant also as-
serted that Rules 404108 and 609 supported his position. The
government, in its response to defendant's motion, asserted that the sole
purpose for the introduction of the prior conviction was to impeach the
defendant should he choose to testify, and that the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighed the danger of prejudice. The govern-
ment also asserted that Rule 404 was inapplicable because it applies only
to evidence introduced to prove character, not to impeach credibility.10 9
106. 740 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 502. The one caveat to the court's holding is that the admissibility of prior convic-
tions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement is subject to the ten-year time limit embodied
in FED. R. EVID. 609(b). That Rule provides in relevant part:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years
has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the con-
finement imposed for the conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court deter-
mines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
108. For the text of FED. R. EvID. 404, see supra notes 26 and 28. Generally, character evidence
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that a person acted "in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion," but such evidence may be used for other purposes, including for impeachment
of a witness's (including a defendant's) credibility. An analysis of the policy considerations raised by
the interplay of Rules 404 and 609 is beyond the scope of this article. It is well established that the
government may introduce prior bad acts, including convictions, of an accused if it can establish that
the evidence is offered for a purpose other than to prove the defendant's propensity to commit
crimes. See supra notes 28 to 46 and accompanying text. At the same time, it is generally agreed
that once a defendant's criminal record is revealed to the jury, a limiting instruction that the evi-
dence is only to be considered for the purpose of evaluating the defendant's credibility rather than as
evidence of his guilt is practically useless. See, e.g., Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the
Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 215,
218-19 (1968).
109. See supra note 108. The correctness of the government's assertion is so firmly established
that the Seventh Circuit did not even address the issue in its opinion.
EVIDENCE
The trial court denied defendant's motion. The defendant, accordingly,
did not take the stand.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that in United States v.
Papia,"10 it had specifically reserved the issue of whether district courts
retain discretion under Rule 403 to exclude a prior conviction admissible
under Rule 609(a)(2). Rule 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of a prior
conviction may be used to attack the credibility of a witness "but only if
the crime. . . involved dishonesty or false statement." As a preliminary
matter, the Seventh Circuit noted that the balancing test incorporated in
Rule 609(a)(1) is specifically omitted from 609(a)(2). Also, the defendant
in Kuecker conceded that mail fraud involves "dishonesty or false state-
ment" for Rule 609 purposes.111  Thus, according to the court, Rule
609(a)(2) was the applicable rule, and the only issue was whether that
Rule is subject to the balancing test of Rule 403.
The Seventh Circuit first noted that since its decision in Papia,
112
"all circuits that have decided the issue have ruled that evidence of prior
convictions for crimes involving 'dishonesty or false statement' is admis-
sible without a balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect."
113
The Seventh Circuit carefully reviewed the rationales of the two leading
cases. In United States v. Wong,' 14 the Third Circuit thoroughly ex-
amined the legislative history of Rule 609(a) to reach its conclusion that
a trial court has no discretion to exclude 609(a)(2) crimes. In adopting
the holding of Wong, the Seventh Circuit in Kuecker simply stated, with-
out further discussion, that two citations from the legislative history of
Rule 609(a) "suffice[d] to demonstrate the propriety of the prevailing
view." 115 The Conference Report states: "The admission of prior con-
victions involving dishonesty and false statement is not within the discre-
tion of the court. Such convictions are peculiarly probative of credibility
and, under this rule, are always to be admitted."
'1 16
110. 560 F.2d 827, 845 n. 10 (7th Cir. 1977).
111. The courts have had no difficulty in finding that crimes involving fraud are crimes of "dis-
honesty or false statement." See, e.g., United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977) (mail fraud); United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
112. 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
113. Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 501 (citing United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 66-68 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983); United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981); United
States v. Leyva, 659 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); United States
v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980)).
114. 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983).
115. Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 501.
116. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7098, 7103, quoted in Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 501. The second citation from the legisla-
tive history quoted in Kuecker is to the same effect.
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The court in Kuecker also relied on another leading case, United
States v. Kiendra, 1 7 finding that "the First Circuit in Kiendra persua-
sively resolves any residual doubt about the possible conflict between
rules 403 and 609(a)(2) upon which the defendant [Kuecker] bases his
claim that a trial court must always balance probativeness against preju-
dice." 118 The Seventh Circuit first noted that Rule 403 is the general
evidentiary provision that permits the exclusion of relevant evidence that
"is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" to the
defendant. According to the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit in Kien-
dra correctly concluded that Rule 609 controls any conflict between the
provision in Rule 403 that provides "although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed" and the provi-
sion in Rule 609(a)(2) that provides that "evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted . . .but only if the crime . . .
involved dishonesty or false statement." 119 The Seventh Circuit agreed
with the Kiendra court's rationale for the conclusion that Rule 609 con-
trols any possible conflict between Rules 609 and 403. That rationale
was stated by the Kiendra court as follows: "Rule 403 is a general provi-
sion intended to govern a wide landscape of evidentiary concerns; Rule
609 is a narrow provision intended to regulate the impeachment of wit-
nesses who have been convicted of prior crimes." 120 After quoting the
foregoing passage with approval, the Seventh Circuit added that as a gen-
eral rule of statutory construction, specific language in one provision
controls over the general language of another. Thus, in this context, the
specific language of Rule 609 controls over the general language of Rule
403.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found additional support for its holding
in the fact that certain language in a draft of Rule 609 was eliminated
from the final version. In a draft version of the Rule, the balancing of
prejudice versus probativeness specifically applied to felonies and to
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punish-
ment. In the final version of Rule 609(a)(2), the language requiring bal-
ancing for crimes of dishonesty or false statement was omitted.
121
The rule adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Kuecker is undoubtedly
in accord with the legislative intent, 22 and the court's adoption is a pre-
117. 663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1981).
118. Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 502.
119. Id. (emphasis added by the court).
120. Kiendra, 663 F.2d at 354, quoted in Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 502.
121. Kuecker, 740 F.2d at 502 (citing 51 F.R.D. 315 at 391, 393 (1973)).
122. See supra notes 116, 120 and accompanying text.
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dictable and sound result. 23 Indeed, in light of the Rule's legislative
history, perhaps the only surprising aspect is that it has taken the Circuit
Courts of Appeals ten years (the length of time the Rules have been in
effect) to reach a consensus on the matter. Again, the courts' previous
indecision is probably attributable to the controversy surrounding the en-
tire issue of the use of prior convictions, the many revisions of the Rule,
and perhaps most importantly, defendants' strenuous efforts to exclude
such damaging evidence.
The Seventh Circuit during the 1984-85 term had occasion to apply
the rule it adopted in the Kuecker decision in United States v. Noble. 124
While Noble broke no new ground, it is an excellent example of the inter-
woven nature of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Very few of the Rules
may be considered in isolation; the possible interplay between two or
more rules must always be considered.
In Noble, defendant was convicted of counterfeiting Federal Reserve
Notes; he did not testify. At trial, defense counsel introduced a taped
conversation between an undercover agent and defendant, wherein de-
fendant denied having any knowledge of counterfeiting operations or of
his (Noble's) prior counterfeiting activities with a Mr. Handelman. The
government then moved to impeach the defendant's taped statements
with the introduction of his prior counterfeiting conviction. The district
court admitted the prior conviction pursuant to Rules 806125 and
609(a)(2).
126
The Seventh Circuit affirmed that evidentiary ruling. The appellate
court noted that the Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule 806
states that "[T]he declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted
into evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility should in fairness be
123. But see supra note 108 regarding some of the policy considerations raised by the rule the
Seventh Circuit has adopted. The defendant with a criminal record is placed in the dilemma of
either taking the stand and being impeached with his prior convictions, in which case the jury is
likely to, despite limiting instructions, regard the convictions as evidence of guilt, or not taking the
stand, risking the danger that the jury will conclude he is guilty. Some commentators have sug-
gested that such a "choice" runs counter to our traditional notions of justice. See, e.g., Note, Consti-
tutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of
Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 168 (1968). Of course, no
one denies that there are competing interests at stake, which is precisely why prior conviction evi-
dence is so controversial.
124. 754 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 63 (1985).
125. FED. R. EVID. 806 provides that when a hearsay statement (in Noble, defendant's tape-
recorded statement) has been admitted into evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked
by evidence "which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness."
The Rule is infrequently invoked; Noble is the only Seventh Circuit decision this term which ad-
dressed it. As seen in that case, the Rule provides the government with a means for bringing to the
attention of the jury a defendant's prior convictions even where the defendant does not testify.
126. Noble, 754 F.2d at 1330.
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subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified.
See Rules 608 and 609 . . ,,127 The court found that when defense
counsel introduced into evidence the taped conversation containing the
defendant's exculpatory hearsay statements, counsel placed the defend-
ant's credibility in issue. Thus, Rule 806, which allows impeachment of
a non-testifying defendant, was properly applied by the district court. 128
Next, the Seventh Circuit examined the specific evidence used to im-
peach - the prior counterfeiting conviction - and held that it was prop-
erly admitted, without any judicial balancing, under Rule 609(a)(2) and
the Seventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Kuecker.
129
With respect to Rule 609(a)(2), Noble is simply a straightforward
application of Kuecker. The interplay between Rules 806 and 609(a)(2),
however, provides the government with a powerful tool that can be used
against an unwary defendant. 130 The existence of that tool points up the
competing interests at stake when prior conviction evidence is sought to
be introduced. On the one hand is the jury's need to assess relevant evi-
dence, including the defendant's credibility, in its search for the truth.
On the other hand is our system's fundamental notion that the defendant
is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The admission of prior convic-
tions to impeach poses the grave danger that the jury will view that evi-
dence as evidence of guilt. A balance had to be struck somewhere,
however, by the legislature; the decision it reached on convictions involv-
ing dishonesty or false statement, as revealed by the legislative history
and as interpreted by the courts, is a reasonable one. The legislature
determined that because such convictions are peculiarly probative of
credibility, the admission of those convictions is not within the discretion
of the court.1 31 While alternative solutions to the problems posed by
prior conviction evidence have been advanced,1 32 no solution is free of
problems. The Seventh Circuit in Kuecker and Noble commendably
adopted the legislature's solution, as it has been interpreted by all the
Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.
127. Id. at 1331 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 806, Advisory Committee Note).
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1984)).
130. The court in Noble noted that defense "counsel's comment when he learned that the court
was allowing the use of the conviction was: 'quite frankly, I have to admit to being caught flatfooted
as to this. . . . I am totally shocked and absolutely unprepared that this would happen and that this
would be admitted .... ' Noble, 754 F.2d at 1335 n. 10. The Seventh Circuit also rejected No-
ble's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 1335-36.
131. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
132. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[02] at 609-58 to -60
(1985) (summarizing the "four main solutions" that have been proposed by courts, commentators,
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, including the advantages and disadvantages of each).
546
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RULE 701: OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
Rule 701 provides that a lay witness may testify to an opinion or
inference that is rationally based on his perception and helpful either to a
clear understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in
issue.133 The Rule assumes that a lay witness will testify in as "raw a
form as practicable" but permits inferences or opinions if it aids the trier
of fact.134 Article VII, in general, and Rule 701, in particular, reflect the
general philosophy of the Federal Rules of Evidence which favors the
admissibility of relevant evidence. 135 The Seventh Circuit has tradition-
ally held that the decision concerning whether opinion testimony is ad-
missible is within the discretion of the trial court. 136 Consequently, the
review of the application of Rule 701 in most cases is cursory and the
analysis is usually limited to a search for an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
An example of the limited amount of review the Seventh Circuit will
perform when Rule 701 is at issue is illustrated in Kelsay v. Consolidated
Rail Corporation. 137 In Kelsay, the plaintiff appealed from a jury verdict
in favor of the defendants. 138 The suit arose out of an accident between
plaintiff's decedent and a train. A white line was painted on the street
before the railroad crossing where the accident occurred. 139 The plaintiff
claimed that the trial judge erred in allowing two witnesses to testify
regarding the legal significance of the white line.
The testimony of the two witnesses was important to the defendants'
attempt to show that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 14° The
first witness was the county sheriff. On cross-examination the defendant
133. FED. R. EvID. 701 states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or infer-
ences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.
134. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 701[01] (1982).
135. FED. R. EVID. 704, Advisory Committee Note states: "Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions
must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes
time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admissions of opinions which would
merely tell the jury what result to reach, . . . ."
136. See United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1000 (1981); United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1982).
137. 749 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 440. One defendant, Amtrak, owned and the other defendant, Conrail, operated the
train involved in the accident.
139. Id. at 446. The white line was painted on the street thirty-one feet south of the railroad
crossing.
140. Id. Evidence of a failure to abide by regulations that require motorists to stop could lead
the jury to conclude that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, especially in light of the court's
instructions that violation of a safety regulation or statute is presumptively an act of negligence.
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asked the sheriff about the white line. Over plaintiff's objection, the trial
court allowed the witness to answer that the white line, in his opinion, is
a place to stop.' 4' The second witness was a safety manager. 42 The
defendant again asked what the white line meant. The witness responded
that "the state law means slow down." 143 Plaintiff contended that this
testimony should be categorized as lay opinion testimony about the law
and should not have been allowed because the witnesses did not meet the
requirements set out in Rule 701. 44
The court began its analysis by stating that it believed that the jury
understood that the two witnesses were merely expressing their own per-
sonal opinions. The court then stated that the decision of whether to
admit testimony under Rule 701 is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court
abused its discretion. 145 After refusing to analyze the Rule in detail, the
court assumed without deciding that the trial court erred in allowing the
testimony. The court suggested that it would have been preferable to
have given a specific jury instruction on the legal significance of the white
line.' 46 However, the court held that no reversible error occurred be-
cause the court found the testimony ambiguous and the testimony at is-
sue "encompassed only a few lines in a five-day trial."'
' 47
In Kelsay, the court fashioned an analysis that basically rubber-
stamped the lower court's decision. Rule 701 explicitly limits lay testi-
mony in the form of opinion to testimony which is rationally based on
the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony or to determination of a fact in issue.' 48 It does not appear
that the opinions at issue here met either criteria. The testimony that the
white line means to stop is not an opinion rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness. This is testimony that should have been elicited from
an expert. 49 This is even more apparent since the court found that no
state statute imposed a duty to stop at a white line.' 50 Finally, the
court's finding that no reversible error occurred because of the brevity of
141. Id. at 446.
142. Id. at 439. The safety manager was employed by the G.T.E. Corporation, the plaintiff's
employer.
143. Id. at 446-47.
144. See supra note 133.
145. See supra note 136.
146. Kelsay, 749 F.2d at 448.
147. Id.
148. FED. R. EvID. 701. See supra note 133.
149. See Hintz v. Jamison, 743 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing the plaintiff's expert witness, a civil engineer, to help explain the Illinois road sign
requirements).
150. Kelsay, 749 F.2d at 448.
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the testimony disregards the importance of the testimony and fails to
take into account the vagaries that may guide a jury.
In Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, Inc.,'151 the Seventh Circuit again
deferred to the trial judge's decision regarding the admissibility of opin-
ion testimony by a lay witness. In contrast to Kelsay, 5 2 where the trial
court allowed opinion testimony that appeared to be outside the wit-
nesses' firsthand knowledge or observation, the trial court in Gorby ex-
cluded opinion testimony that appeared to be within the witness'
observation.
In Gorby, the plaintiff was severely injured when the defendant's
semi-tanker truck collided with the plaintiff's pick-up truck at a highway
intersection. 153 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The
defendant contended that excluding certain lay opinion testimony consti-
tuted reversible error. At trial, the defendant offered the testimony of an
eyewitness to the collision. The witness testified that he had been a li-
censed driver for twenty-nine years and that visibility was good on the
night of the accident. 54 The defendant then sought two opinions from
the witness. The witness was prepared to testify that, in his opinion, the
truck driver had insufficient time to avoid the accident.155 The court
characterized this testimony as stating that the defendant did everything
he could to avoid the accident. 56 The court then determined that the
witness did not have firsthand knowledge because he was not present in
the truck with the driver. Therefore, the witness could not know the
exact measures the defendant took to avoid the accident. In addition, the
witness was not familiar with the safety equipment on the truck and he
lacked other specific information about the defendant's truck. Thus, the
court concluded that the witness did not have the personal knowledge
necessary to formulate an admissible lay opinion. 157
The witness was also prepared to testify that the plaintiff could have
avoided the accident. 58 The appellate court found that this was a closer
question because the plaintiff's pick-up truck was similar to a vehicle
with which the witness was familiar. However, limiting its review to
identifying an abuse of discretion, the court concluded that there was no
151. 741 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1984).
152. 749 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1984).
153. Gorby, 741 F.2d at 1016.
154. Id. at 1020. The accident occurred at approximately 11:00 p.m. on October 5, 1977.
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abuse by the trial court. 159 The court found nothing in the record to
show that the witness was familiar with the particular type of pick-up
truck the plaintiff drove or the safety features of the truck. Therefore,
the trial judge could have found that the witness's testimony was based
upon speculation and not firsthand knowledge.160 Consequently, the ap-
pellate court found no reversible error.
This decision appears to be opposed to the general philosophy of the
Federal Rules, which favors the admissibility of relevant evidence.16 1 In
addition, the court's analysis appears to misconstrue the rationale under-
lying Rule 701. Rule 701 allows opinion testimony by a lay witness if it
will aid the trier of fact and is rationally based on his perception.162 The
witness in Gorby was not testifying as an expert witness. Thus it is not
important whether he was familiar with the safety equipment on the ve-
hicles. The witness was testifying to what he perceived to have occurred.
Clearly the court could have excluded the testimony if it found that it
was not helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony. However, no
such finding was made by either court. Thus it appears that the trial
court confused expert testimony and opinion testimony by lay persons.
Furthermore, the appellate court's limited review failed to fully analyze
the relevant issues in this case.
RULE 702: EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rule 702 allows an expert witness to testify if his knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue. 163 The Rule is broad in scope and recognizes that it is often diffi-
cult to evaluate facts without the help of specialized knowledge.
164
Therefore, the Rule allows testimony in any specialized field of knowl-
edge, not just in scientific or technical areas. The definition of expert is
also broad since it includes persons qualified by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training or education. 65 Thus, an expert need not be qualified by
education alone but may be qualified through special knowledge or expe-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1022.
161. FED. R. EvID. 402.
162. See supra note 133.
163. FED. R. EvID. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise."
164. See FED. R. EvID. 702, Advisory Committee Note.
165. FED. R. EvID. 702, Advisory Committee Note states: "The rule is broadly phrased ...
the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by 'knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.' "
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rience. During the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit decided several
cases that dealt with Rule 702. In each case the Seventh Circuit read the
Rule in a broad manner.
An example of an expert qualified by experience is illustrated in
Western Industries, Inc. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd. 166 In Western Indus-
tries, the plaintiff purchased custom-built welding machinery from the
defendant. 167 The machines did not work correctly and the plaintiff
brought a breach of contract action against defendant. The defendant
claimed that the custom in the specialty welding machine trade is not to
give a disappointed buyer consequential damages. 6 Therefore, the de-
fendant argued that the district court erred in refusing to allow the de-
fendant to introduce testimony concerning the existence of such a trade
custom.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in not allowing
the defendant to put on three witnesses to testify to the alleged cus-
tom. 169 The court began its analysis by stating that under the "liberal
definition" of an expert in Rule 702, all of the witnesses could have been
readily qualified as expert witnesses on the question of trade custom.
The court referred to the Advisory Committee Note which states that
"within the scope of the rule are . . . the large group sometimes called
skilled witnesses."' 70 Two of the witnesses were experienced executives
of companies that manufactured specialty welding machinery, with al-
most seventy-five years of experience in selling the type of machinery
involved. The other witness was a former executive of Western Indus-
tries and had extensive experience buying welding machinery. Further-
more, each had negotiated many sales contracts similar to the one in
issue. Therefore, the existence of the alleged custom was a matter which
they could infer from their own observation and experience. Thus, the
court concluded that the witnesses should have been allowed to testify
under Rule 702 because their testimony would have assisted in the deter-
mination of a fact in issue and they were qualified by their knowledge
and experience.' 7' The court's decision in Western Industries is consis-
166. 739 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984).
167. Id. at 1201. The machinery was needed to manufacture the cavities for microwave ovens.
168. Id. The defendant contended it was not liable for any damages in excess of the purchase
price.
169. Id. at 1201-02.
170. FED. R. EVID. 702, Advisory Committee Note states: "Thus within the scope of the rule
are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g. physicians, physicists, and architects, but
also the large group sometimes called skilled witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to
land values."
171. 739 F.2d at 1202.
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tent with the broad definition of expert witness found in Rule 702.172
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 173 also illustrates the broad scope
of the definition of expert witness that the Seventh Circuit continued to
embrace during the last term. In Douglass, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had invaded her right of privacy by publishing nude photo-
graphs. 1 74 The plaintiff had authorized Playboy magazine to publish the
photographs but did not authorize the defendant to use the photographs.
The plaintiff used an expert witness to distinguish the two magazines. 175
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in allowing
the plaintiff to use an expert to testify to the tastelessness and vulgarity of
the defendant's magazine.
The court began its analysis by noting that experts are allowed to
testify in obscenity cases. 176 The court could find no basis for distin-
guishing a defamation case from obscenity cases. 177 The court also noted
that although expert testimony is not required on matters of taste, it is
not forbidden. 178 Finding no constitutional reason to preclude the expert
testimony, the court then looked to see if the testimony was admissable
under Rule 702.179
The court noted that Rule 702 defines experts broadly to include
skilled laymen. The court found that the expert was more than a skilled
lay person since he was an experienced English teacher, writer and edi-
tor. The court was skeptical, however, as to whether an expert should be
allowed to testify on as vague and impressionistic an issue as offensive-
ness.' 80 However, the court acknowledged that expert testimony is ad-
missible whenever it concerns a topic on which a lay jury would be
assisted by such testimony. The court concluded that a jury cannot be
assumed to be familiar with the type of magazines at issue. Therefore,
the court could not find as a matter of law that the testimony could not
have helped the jury make the distinction upon which the plaintiff's case
depended and held the expert testimony was admissible. The court's
analysis in Douglass, while brief, was consistent with the broad and inclu-
sive nature of Rule 702.
172. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
173. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986).
174. Id. at 1131-32.
175. Id. at 1441.
176. Id. at 1442. See United States v. Bagnell, 879 F.2d 826, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1982).
177. 769 F.2d at 1442.
178. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 302 (1978).
179. See supra note 163.
180. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1138.
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HEARSAY
Hearsay 1' issues are probably the most litigated of all the eviden-
tiary issues addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The area is
fraught with conceptual problems. The courts struggle with it, 1s2 law-
yers and judges are spurred to creativity by it,' 3 and the commentators
are endlessly fascinated by it. 184 A concise, useful overview of the hear-
say problem is presented in the Advisory Committee Note to Article
VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence.18 5
The Seventh Circuit addressed numerous hearsay issues during the
1984-85 term. A review of the case law reveals that no more specific
conclusion can be drawn than that the Seventh Circuit applies the hear-
say rules liberally and flexibly, favoring admissibility. In that regard, the
Seventh Circuit is in line with the general trend among the federal
courts.18 6  In some areas, notably the co-conspirator exception, 187 the
court seems to go too far, refusing to even consider confrontation
clause18 8 challenges to evidence admissible under the Federal Rule. 189
181. Article VIII of the Rules, FED. R. EVID. 801-806, addresses hearsay. The approach to
hearsay in the Rules is that of the common law, ie., a general rule excluding hearsay, with excep-
tions under which evidence is not required to be excluded even though hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801
provides definitions of "statement," "declarant," "hearsay," and "statements which are not hear-
say." FED. R. EvID. 801(c) defines "hearsay" as follows: "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."
182. For example, in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), the trial court
admitted certain statements into evidence as prior inconsistent statements under FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit decided that the foregoing Rule was inapplicable. Bell, 746 F.2d
at 1274 n. 83. The Seventh Circuit considered the applicability of two other Rules, ultimately con-
cluding that the statements were admissible because they were non-hearsay. Id. at 1274-75.
183. Particularly interesting arguments are advanced where the proponent of an out-of-court
statement offers it into evidence on the theory that the statement is not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted and thus is admissible as non-hearsay. See, e.g., United States v. Irwin, 736 F.2d
1489 (1 1th Cir. 1984). In that case, defendants were charged with bank robbery. An FBI agent
testified that an eyewitness, who had previously stated that he had made no prior identification of
defendant from photographs, had in fact selected defendant's picture from a photograph spread.
The FBI agent's testimony was admitted as non-hearsay on the theory that the testimony was not
offered to prove the identity of the person the witness saw leaving the bank, but rather was offered to
show that the witness had made a prior identification.
184. See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, 4 CURRENT LAW INDEX 303
(1983) (selective index to law review articles lists over 50 articles on hearsay evidence published in
1983).
185. Advisory Committee Note, Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem, reprinted in FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 99-103 (West 1984).
186. See, e.g., Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 LITIGATION 13, 13 (1983) ("Three words describe
the direction in which the Federal Rules of Evidence have taken us: discretion, creativity, and admis-
sibility." [Emphasis in original]).
187. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a
party and is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy."
188. The confrontation clause secures an accused's right to confront witnesses against him. U.S.
Const. amend. VI.
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For the most part, however, the Seventh Circuit has succeeded in resolv-
ing the many difficult problems raised by the hearsay rules reasonably,
fairly, and conscientiously.
RULE 804(B)(1): FORMER TESTIMONY
United States v. Feldman, °90 an important decision, was a case of
first impression. 191 The issue before the appellate court was whether a
deposition taken in an earlier civil proceeding was admissible in a later
criminal prosecution. In Feldman, defendants Feldman and Martenson
were found guilty of several counts of wire fraud from practices in con-
nection with the sale of precious metal futures. The government's case
relied heavily on the deposition of a former business associate, Sanburg,
taken without any cross-examination in an earlier civil proceeding. The
defendants in the civil proceeding were Sanburg, Feldman and Marten-
son. Unknown to Feldman and Martenson, Sanburg had agreed with the
government the day before his deposition to testify against Feldman and
Martenson in return for a promise that Sanburg himself would not be a
target of any later legal proceedings. This agreement was not disclosed
for almost a year, until just a short time before Feldman's and Marten-
189. Although the Seventh Circuit dealt with numerous co-conspirator cases this past term,
those decisions are not discussed herein. For an excellent discussion of the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sions on the co-conspirator exception during the 1983-84 term, as well as the Seventh Circuit's
leading cases on the subject, see Seventh Circuit Review-Evidence: Application and Refinement of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in the Seventh Circuit, 61 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 415-25 (1985). The
court's decisions of the 1984-85 term mark no departure from precedent; rather, they illustrate that
the court continues to clearly favor the admission of co-conspirator statements. Generally, it may be
said that if a co-conspirator made the statement, it comes into evidence, under Seventh Circuit case
law. Illustrative cases include the following: United States v. Koopmans, 757 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.
1985) (held, error for district court to admit certain hearsay statements under the co-conspirator
exception where the statements were not made during the course of a conspiracy that the defendant
later joined, but error was harmless); United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1984) (in arson
case, conspiracy continues until the conspirators collect the insurance proceeds; therefore, state-
ments made after the building was burned but before the money was obtained are admissible under
the co-conspirator exception); United States v. Magnus, 743 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1984) (trial court
admitted certain statements under the co-conspirator exception; appellate court ruled that the state-
ments were admissible as non-hearsay, because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, even though the government had not argued that theory).
190. 761 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985).
191. The Seventh Circuit in Feldman stated: "We have been unable to find any case squarely
addressing the use of an uncross-examined civil deposition in a criminal proceeding. We therefore
undertake our own analysis under both Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) and the Confrontation Clause to
determine if [the] deposition was properly admitted." Id. at 384. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness: Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or in a civil
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
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son's criminal trial. At the time of Sanburg's deposition, the government
had not returned a criminal indictment against Feldman or Martenson.
Sanburg, whom the government knew to be terminally ill, died less than
a month after his deposition. Both Feldman and Martenson received no-
tice of Sanburg's deposition through counsel. Neither Feldman, Marten-
son, nor their attorneys attended the Sanburg deposition.
On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission of Sanburg's
deposition violated their constitutional right to confront witnesses
against them. The Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that
the trial court erred in admitting the deposition under Rule 804(b)(1) 192
and that the admission of that evidence violated the confrontation
clause. 1
93
Rule 804(b)(1) requires that a defendant have sufficient notice 94
and opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant whose testimony
is offered against him. The Seventh Circuit, relying on United States v.
Franklin, 95 reasoned that "[m]ere 'naked opportunity' to cross-examine
is not enough; there must also be a perceived 'real need or incentive to
thoroughly cross-examine' at the time of the deposition."' 196 Under the
circumstances of the case, the court found that the defendants did not
have the opportunity to cross-examine Sanburg. But, the court contin-
ued, even if the defendants had sufficient notice and opportunity to cross-
examine, Rule 804(b)(1) also requires that the defendants had a "similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examina-
tion." The court looked to Zenith Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., 197 which set forth four circumstances or factors which influence mo-
tive to develop testimony. Two of those factors are trial strategy and the
potential penalties or financial stakes. 198 According to the Seventh Cir-
cuit, "[c]onsideration of [those two factors] persuades us that under
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1)'s 'similarity of motive' test, Sanburg's deposition
was inadmissible in the criminal trial. ' 199
With respect to the trial strategy factor, the court noted that in the
192. See supra note 191.
193. Feldman, 761 F.2d at 390.
194. The court in Feldman was not convinced that the notice given to the defendants met the
requirements of FED. R. CIV. PRO. 30(b) but found it unnecessary to decide that issue. Id. at 385
n.5.
195. 235 F. Supp. 338 (D.D.C. 1964).
196. Feldman, 761 F.2d at 385 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. 338, 341
(D.D.C. 1964)).
197. 505 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983).
198. Zenith Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
199. Feldman, 761 F.2d at 385.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
civil proceeding, neither of the defendants contested the government's
motion for a permanent injunction. Their strategy was not to contest any
of the government's claims. In contrast, in the criminal case, defendants
vigorously sought to prove their innocence. The admission of Sanburg's
testimony also failed under the criterion set forth in Zenith regarding the
similarity of potential penalties or financial stakes. In the civil proceed-
ings, neither defendant had any exposure to personal liability. According
to the court, it was thus understandable that neither party attended
Sanburg's deposition. In contrast, in the criminal proceeding, the de-
fendants faced, and received, fines and imprisonment. (Each defendant
had been sentenced by the trial court to twelve years of imprisonment
and fined $38,000.)2
00
In short, at the time of the Sanburg deposition, no criminal charges
were pending against the defendants, they had no reason to suspect that
they should cross-examine Sanburg, and there was no party at the depo-
sition who could be deemed a predecessor in interest to either defendant.
For these reasons, the court held that the trial court erred in admitting
the deposition under Rule 804(b)(1). 20
1
The constitutional challenge to the admission of the deposition re-
quired a different analysis. The United States Supreme Court's test for
admissibility where the declarant is unavailable is whether the testimony
bears sufficient "indicia of reliability. ' 20 2 In United States ex rel. Hay-
wood v. Wolff 2 0 3 the Seventh Circuit set forth a test, derived from Ohio v.
Roberts,20 4 under which "statements are admissible even where there was
no cross-examination if it is clear (1) that the declarant actually made the
statement . . . and (2) there is circumstantial evidence supporting its ve-
racity. ' 20 5 The court in Feldman found "Sanburg's testimony of dubious
credibility, ' 20 6 in part because of the agreement between the government
and Sanburg. The government on appeal attempted to show that there
was circumstantial evidence supporting Sanburg's deposition, but the
court found that parts of the deposition were unsupported by any exter-
nal evidence. Accordingly, the court concluded that sufficient indicia of
reliability were not present; therefore, the admission of the deposition
violated the confrontation clause. 20
7
200. Id. at 383.
201. Id. at 384-85.
202. Id. at 387 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)).
203. 685 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981).
204. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
205. Feldman, 761 F.2d at 387.
206. Id. at 387.
207. Id. at 388.
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Feldman is one of the few cases this past term in which the Seventh
Circuit reversed a criminal conviction on an evidentiary ground. In
Feldman, unlike most criminal appeals, the principal issue on appeal was
the evidentiary one; moreover, the deposition was the government's main
piece of evidence against the defendants. (The Seventh Circuit variously
referred to the deposition as the "centerpiece" and "heart" of the govern-
ment's case, and noted the deposition's "devastating effect at trial.") The
decision is a well-reasoned one, properly focusing on the purposes and
policy considerations behind the Federal Rule and the constitutional pro-
vision at issue, on basic principles of fairness, and on the circumstances
surrounding Sanburg's deposition.
With respect to Rule 804(b)(1), the court in Feldman did not simply
look at the language in the Rule that requires an "opportunity" to de-
velop the former testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination and
then conclude that since the defendants received notice of Sanburg's dep-
osition, the Rule was satisfied. Rather, the court properly focused on
whether, at the time of the deposition, the defendants had a motive to
cross-examine the deponent that was similar to the motive they had at
the criminal trial to cross-examine the now unavailable declarant.
Clearly, the Rule contemplates that where a defendant had an opportu-
nity and similar motive to develop the prior testimony by cross-examina-
tion, it is fair to that defendant to allow that testimony to be used against
him.20  Thus the Seventh Circuit in Feldman was correct in looking to
the circumstances surrounding the taking of the civil deposition to deter-
mine, in essence, whether it was fair to allow the Sanburg deposition to
be used against the defendants.
Similarly, in conducting its constitutional analysis, the court focused
on the circumstances surrounding the civil deposition to determine
whether the deposition bore sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissi-
ble. The court noted that it has allowed uncross-examined testimony
into evidence under certain circumstances. 20 9 In Feldman, however,
Sanburg gave testimony which exculpated himself in exchange for immu-
nity that would preserve his estate from any civil judgment, costs, or
attorneys' fees. The court noted that when an immunity agreement is
involved, there is substantial likelihood that the statements are self-serv-
ing and therefore unreliable. 2 10 Furthermore, the court found that the
208. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 804(b)(1) states that the question of the admissibil-
ity of prior testimony "resolves itself into whether fairness allows imposing, upon the party against
whom now offered, the handling of the witness on the earlier occasion."
209. Feldman, 761 F.2d at 387.
210. Id. at 388 (citing United States v. Turner, 475 F. Supp. 194, 198 (E.D. Mich. 1978)).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
government produced insufficient external evidence to support Sanburg's
deposition. In short, the court was clearly suspicious of Sanburg's mo-
tives in giving his deposition. The court properly focused on whether,
under the circumstances, Sanburg's deposition could be considered relia-
ble enough to satisfy the constitutional mandate of the Sixth
Amendment. 2
1 t
RULE 803(6): BUSINESS RECORDS
During the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit addressed the business
records exception to the hearsay rule212 on several occasions and in a
variety of factual contexts. In all the cases reviewed, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's evidentiary ruling admitting the record being
challenged. The decisions illustrate that the district courts continue to
construe the business records exception broadly and that the Seventh
Circuit continues to accord great deference to the district courts' deter-
minations in this area. Although most of the results reached are sound,
at least one decision, United States v. Kasvin,2 13 suggests that the district
courts may be applying the exception too liberally, giving inadequate at-
tention to the Rule's proviso that records which otherwise meet the
Rule's requirements should be excluded if the circumstances of their
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
211. One other decision in the 1984-85 term addressed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). In United
States v. Pizarro, 756 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2686 (1985) (Pizarro I1), the court
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the declarant was not unavailable
for purposes of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) and thus the declarant's prior testimony was not admissible
under that Rule. The trial court had found that the proponent of the statement, defendant Pizarro,
had procured the absence of the declarant by threats; thus the declarant was not unavailable pursu-
ant to FED. R. EVID. 804(a). The Seventh Circuit's decision in a prior proceeding of the Pizarro
case, United States v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 349 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pizarro 1) was one of the cases
relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985) on the
issue of whether Feldman and Martenson had a "similar motive" to cross-examine Sanburg at his
deposition. In Pizarro I, the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the
proffered prior testimony, because the government did have both the opportunity and motive to
develop the testimony at the prior proceeding.
212. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances or preparation indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
213. 757 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 592 (1985). See infra notes 223 to 242 and
accompanying text.
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In United States v. Croft,2 14 defendant argued that the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence computer printouts containing the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin's payroll records. Defendant contended that the
Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Weatherspoon215 required
that the government must establish the accuracy of the input procedures
before computer printouts can be introduced into evidence. The court
acknowledged that even where a proper foundation 216 is established for a
business record, it is inadmissible if "the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness."' 217 In Croft, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the wit-
ness testifying to the records concerning the accuracy of the computer
and the input procedures. The printouts were reviewed and audited for
accuracy on a regular basis and were relied upon by the University to
complete tax forms for the Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the
court found that the records' accuracy and reliability had been estab-
lished and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the printouts.
21 8
The only surprising aspect of United States v. Croft is that the Sev-
enth Circuit found that the hearsay issue raised by defendant merited any
discussion at all. Some state courts do have much more restrictive rules
for the admission of computer printouts as opposed to other business
records.219 A few commentators have argued that the admissibility re-
quirements are too lenient. 220 The federal courts, however, properly
treat computer printouts the same as any other business record. United
214. 750 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984).
215. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978). In Weatherspoon, the Seventh Circuit held that computer
printouts were properly admitted into evidence following the government's proof of "what the input
procedures were, . . . that the input procedures and printouts were accurate within two percent,
...that the computer was tested for internal programming errors on a monthly basis, and. . . that
the printouts were made, maintained and relied on . . . in the ordinary course of. . . business
activities." 581 F.2d at 598, quoted in United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1365 n.7.
216. The foundation elements for introducing a business record into evidence are contained in
FED. R. EviD. 803(6), supra note 212. These elements include (1) that the record was kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity and (2) that it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the record.
217. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
218. Croft, 750 F.2d at 1354.
219. For a good discussion of the contrast between the federal courts' approach to computer
printouts and the more restrictive approach of some state courts, particularly Illinois, see Comment,
Admitting Computer Generated Records: A Presumption of Reliability, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 115
(1984). See, e.g., Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Ill.2d 195, 367 N.E.2d 1238
(1977) (failure to present evidence of input procedures, programming and operation of computer
affects admissibility of computer records).
220. See, e.g., Note, A Reconsideration of the Admissibility of Computer Generated Evidence, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 425, 437-51 (1977).
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States v. Croft 221 laid to rest any doubt left by United States v. Weather-
spoon 222 that the proponent of a computer printout must establish with
mathematical precision that the record is accurate.
As in United States v. Croft, the evidentiary issue on appeal in
United States v. Kasvin 223 concerned the clause in Rule 803(6) that pro-
vides for the exclusion of a business record if "the source of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. ' 224 Defendant
Kasvin, along with seven others, was indicted for various drug offenses,
including conspiracy to knowingly and intentionally distribute and pos-
sess with intent to distribute marijuana. Six of Kasvin's co-defendants
pled guilty. The evidence showed that in 1977 or 1978 four of Kasvin's
co-defendants named in the indictment agreed to purchase, sell and dis-
tribute marijuana. Over the next five years, some twenty individuals
were associated with the conspiracy. The headquarters for the operation
became a house in Ingleside, Illinois, which was raided by federal law
enforcement officers on April 9, 1982; Kasvin and seven others were ar-
rested inside. A valid search warrant produced a large quantity of drugs
and records of numerous drug transactions. Those records became an
important part of the government's case against defendant Kasvin. A
reconstruction of the records showed that in the eight months prior to
the raid on April 9, 1982, defendant (identified as customer No. 5) ob-
tained approximately 3,600 pounds of marijuana from the organization
and delivered to it well over $1,000,000 in cash.
2 25
Aside from the organization's records of drug transactions, the pri-
mary evidence that the government produced to link the defendant to the
conspiracy was the testimony of several of Kasvin's co-defendants who
had entered guilty pleas and one or more unindicted co-conspirators.
Those witnesses testified as follows: Kasvin was known to them as
"Smith" or "Smyth;" the persons associated with the operation were
given numbers and Kasvin's number was 5; No. 5 was the single largest
"customer" of the operation but at times he provided it with some high-
quality marijuana; and for more than a year Kasvin was seen at the or-
ganization's place of business several times weekly.
226
It is apparent, although the Seventh Circuit did not specifically state
it, that the business records evidence substantially strengthened the gov-
221. 740 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984).
222. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
223. 757 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 592 (1985).
224. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
225. Kasvin, 757 F.2d at 889.
226. Id. at 889.
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ernment's case against Kasvin. Without the link between the business
records (showing transactions by customer No. 5) and the witnesses' tes-
timony that the number assigned to Kasvin (whom the witnesses knew
only as "Smith") was No. 5, it is likely that the government could not
have proven its case against Kasvin. In fact, the district court had dis-
missed the count against defendant charging him with conspiracy and
intentional possession with intent to distribute the 234 pounds of mari-
juana seized in the raid, on the ground that the government's evidence
was insufficient. 227 After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aiding
and abetting the conspiracy.228 In Kasvin, then, unlike many cases where
the business records exception is an issue, the outcome of the case likely
turned on the admission or exclusion of the records.
The drug organization had begun keeping records of marijuana
purchases and sales approximately nine months prior to the raid. The
records were entered in a general ledger by one of the defendants named
in the indictment, Rodger, who was the girlfriend of the conspiracy's
leader, Ashenfelter. Among those records were numerous receipts show-
ing transactions between a "No. 5" and the organization, and witnesses
had identified Kasvin as being No. 5. After extensive questioning of
Ashenfelter by counsel for the government and for Kasvin, the trial judge
found the records to have been made and kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity by a person with knowledge as a regular
practice of the business activity, and that the records were trustworthy
for the purpose for which they were offered.2 29 The trial judge accord-
ingly admitted the records as business records under Rule 803(6). The
trial judge also assigned Rule 803(24)230 as an additional basis for admit-
1
227. Id.
228. One judge dissented "because the defendant could not have been convicted as an aider and
abettor of the conspiracy and because the defendant was acquitted by the trial judge of being a
member of the conspiracy." Id. at 893 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Judge Swygert did not address the
business records issue.
229. Id. at 892.
230. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) is commonly referred to as one of the two residual exceptions to the
rule against hearsay. Rule 803(24) provides that the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interest of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. How-
ever, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
The second residual exception is found in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). The language of 804(b)(5) is
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ting the records.
Defendant Kasvin's argument on appeal that the records should
have been excluded had considerably more merit than the defendant's
argument in United States v. Croft.231 According to the court in Kasvin,
defendant "strenuously contend[ed] that the records were shown not to
have been reliable and that the trustworthiness requirements of Rule[s]
803(6) and 803(24) were not satisfied."'232 In support of his contention,
Kasvin pointed to the following evidence. First, Ashenfelter testified
that at times the records were made by persons who may have been
under the influence of cocaine; thus, according to defendant, it was prob-
able that the records contained errors. Second, even if Ashenfelter's girl-
friend, Rodger, who lived in the house with him at the organization's
headquarters, had made errors in keeping the records, she would not
have been subject to discharge. Third, Ashenfelter himself was mistaken
as to the number assigned to Kasvin on the books. Fourth, unlike a legit-
imate business, there was no consistency in the organization's records.
233
Finally, Ashenfelter himself did not consider the records to be reliable.
The Seventh Circuit responded to defendant's argument first by not-
ing that although Ashenfelter did not keep the records for income tax
purposes, he did keep them to show the amount of money owed by peo-
ple to whom he distributed drugs; that when errors were found, "hope-
fully they were corrected, ' 234 according to Ashenfelter; and that the
records would more accurately reflect the quantities of marijuana which
passed through the headquarters than would Ashenfelter's memory. Af-
ter setting forth the foregoing evidence, the court went on to hold, with
little discussion, that there was no error in the admission of the business
records. 235 The court acknowledged that business records may be ex-
cluded in the trial court's discretion if the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The court then quoted Rule 102236 (without explaining its specific appli-
identical to the language of 803(24), quoted above. The only difference between the two rules is that
Rule 804 applies where the declarant is unavailable as a witness, whereas the exception contained in
Rule 803 may apply whether or not the declarant is available. The practical effect is that the availa-
bility of the declarant is immaterial where a party (or the court) invokes the residual exception to the
hearsay rule.
231. 750 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant argued that computer printouts were inadmissible
under Rule 803(6) because the government had not proven that the data used to generate the
printouts were completely accurate). See supra notes 214 to 222 and accompanying text.
232. Kasvin, 757 F.2d at 892.
233. Kasvin conceded that the fact that the records reflected illegal transactions did not bar their
admissibility. Id.
234. Id. at 893.
235. Id.
236. FED. R. EvID. 102 states:
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cability to the issue under discussion) and finally held that the evidence
fully justified the trial court's finding that all the requisites of Rule 803(6)
were satisfied. That conclusion, according to the court, made it unneces-
sary to address the admissibility of the records under Rule 803(24).237
Of all the decisions this past term addressing the business records
exception, Kasvin presented the strongest facts for exclusion of the prof-
fered evidence, particularly since the evidence was so damaging.
Although the admission of the business records probably did not rise to
the level of an abuse of discretion, it seems clear that the district court
would have been equally justified in excluding the records. The underly-
ing rationale for the business records exception to the hearsay rule is that
such records are reliable.238 Given the evidence the defendant produced
in opposing the admission of the records, it can be argued that the dis-
trict court largely ignored the language in Rule 803(6) which requires
exclusion if "the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. ' 239 On the other hand,
the scope of the Rule is very broad, clearly favoring admissibility. 240
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit's holding in Kasvin241 that the district
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifi-
able expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
237. The legislative history of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) clearly shows that those residual
exceptions were intended to be used only in exceptional situations. "It is intended that the residual
exceptions will be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not
intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall within
one of the other exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b)." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7065, reprinted in FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, Rule 803 at 147-48 (West
1984).
Both the district courts and the Seventh Circuit have commendably followed the foregoing
legislative intent. Kasvin was the only case in the 1984-85 term in which the trial court invoked the
residual exception, and the Seventh Circuit expressly declined to rest its decision in that case on the
residual exception. This sparing use of the residual exceptions directly contradicts some commenta-
tors' observations that the courts have ignored the legislature's intent. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 320 (West 1981) ("Reported decisions . . . have interpreted Rule
803(24) in light of its express requirements, ignoring in large measure the 'very rarely' and 'excep-
tional circumstances' gloss contained in the Senate Committee's Report.") See also McElhaney, A
Quick Review of the Federal Rules, 9 LITIGATION 8, 12 (1983) (author refers to the residual excep-
tions as "catchall exceptions," implying, at least, that the courts are free to utilize those exceptions
whenever a hearsay statement does not conveniently fit within one of the other exceptions).
238. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(6) states:
The element of unusual reliability of business records is said variously to be supplied by
systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by
actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate
record as part of a continuing job or occupation.
239. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
240. For example, the Rule encompasses records of opinions or diagnoses, and the term "busi-
ness" specifically includes non-profit organizations. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
241. 757 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 592 (1985). Other cases decided during the
past term similarly rejected arguments that records were improperly admitted under Rule 803(6)
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court properly admitted into evidence the records of drug transactions is
consistent with Seventh Circuit case law favoring a liberal construction
of Rule 803(6).242 However, it is suggested that the courts take a more
conservative approach towards business records evidence, to insure that
Rule 803(6) does not become a blanket rule of admissibility, regardless of
the presence of factors indicating that the evidence is untrustworthy.
because the records were unreliable. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1985). In Coates, plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination in employment practices. Defendant em-
ployer introduced into evidence certain disciplinary memoranda. Plaintiffs argued that the discipli-
nary memoranda were prepared and kept primarily for use in the defendant's grievance procedure,
and that consequently there was a high risk that the memoranda were biased. The Seventh Circuit
held that the district court's determination that the memoranda had sufficient indicia of reliability so
as to be admissible under Rule 803(6) was not an abuse of discretion. Coates, 756 F.2d at 550. The
Seventh Circuit noted that the memoranda were part of the systematic conduct of running a busi-
ness. The records were kept according to a regular procedure and for a routine business purpose -
memorializing employee performance - that tended to insure accuracy. In that way, they were
"not prepared primarily with a view toward their use in a subsequent adversarial proceeding." Id.
Accordingly, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.
242. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
833 (1979) (businessman's personal diary listing sporadic payments of bribes to public officials prop-
erly admitted as business record).
